Courts strictly construe the arbitration rules to best effectuate “the Legislature’s intent in enacting the statutes upon which the arbitration rules are based, namely to ‘alleviate the court congestion and reduce the delay in hearing civil cases.’” Wiley, 143 Wn.2d at 344 (quoting Christie-Lambert Van & Storage Co. v. McLeod, 39 Wn. App. 298, 302, 693 P.2d 161 (1984)). “[F]ailure to strictly comply with MAR 7.1(a)’s filing requirement prevents the superior court from conducting a trial de novo.” Nevers, 133 Wn.2d at 811-12 (emphasis omitted). Substantial compliance is insufficient. Id. at 815.
The Lewises do not argue they complied with the statute or court rule. Instead, they urge us to adopt a narrow exception to the mandatory signature requirement and recognize that a trial court has the power to suspend the rules “arising both in equity and in its inherent power to control its own process.” Pet. for Discr. Rev. at 8. Specifically, they claim the trial court properly excused their failure to personally sign the trial de novo request because the county required e-filing during the COVID-19 pandemic yet provided a defective form. We reject this argument.
Our case law has long mandated strict compliance. We have repeatedly and unequivocally held that lack of full compliance with the SCCARs will invalidate a trial de novo request. For example, in Wiley, two of the three defendants filed a trial de novo request but mistakenly omitted the name of the third defendant. 143 Wn.2d at 342. We rejected the trial de novo request, concluding that the failure to include all the defendants’ names “is not an inconsequential error, but rather is a failure to strictly comply with the requirements [of the SCCARs].” Id. at 345. In Pybas v. Paolino, an attorney entrusted a trial de novo request with a legal messenger. 73 Wn. App. 393, 395, 869 P.2d 427 (1994). The messenger failed to file the notice within the 20-day deadline, and the Court of Appeals concluded the party was not entitled to a trial de novo. Id. at 404-05. As a final example, the attorney in State ex rel. J.M.H. v. Hofer was unable to timely file the request because he suffered a head injury and his hospital stay overlapped with the 20-day deadline. 86 Wn. App. 497, 498, 942 P.2d 979 (1997). Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals held the trial de novo request was ineffective in the absence of a timely filing. Id. The case law underscores the importance of strict compliance with the arbitration statutes and rules as being essential to the goal of providing a swift, efficient, and less expensive path to the resolution of cases. Alvarez v. Banach, 153 Wn.2d 834, 838, 109 P.3d 402 (2005) (“[I]f we were to require only substantial compliance with the filing requirements, we would be subverting the legislative intent of mandatory arbitration, which is to reduce congestion in the courts and delays in civil cases.”).
We note that every division of the Court of Appeals has addressed whether a trial de novo can proceed despite a party’s failure to comply with the signature requirements of the newly amended SCCAR 7.1. Each division has answered no based on our case law demanding strict compliance. And each case occurred during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. Shepler v. Terry’s Truck Ctr., Inc., 25 Wn. App. 2d 67, 522 P.3d 126 (2022) (filed trial de novo request in September 2020, using an outdated, county-provided form that did not include space for the aggrieved party’s signature (Division Three)); Butler v. Finneran, 22 Wn. App. 2d 763, 516 P.3d 395 (2022) (filed trial de novo request in August 2020, using Pierce County’s LINX system and did not include aggrieved party’s signature (Division Two)); Hanson, 19 Wn. App. 2d at 463 (filed trial de novo request in October 2020 and the aggrieved party failed to sign the trial de novo request (Division One)). These cases are consistent with the principle that reliance on an outdated form, without reviewing the applicable statute and court rule, does not excuse a party’s failure to strictly comply with the SCCARs and arbitration statute. See, e.g., RPC 1.1; see also Hanson, 19 Wn. App. 2d at 463 (declining to excuse noncompliance with SCCAR 7.1 on the grounds that appellant “relied on an outdated court rule and used an outdated form”). Accepting the Lewises’ “narrow exception” would require us to disapprove of this consistent body of precedent.
Supreme Court of the State of Washington Opinion Information Sheet
Docket Number: 101,329-9 Title of Case: Crossroads Mgmt., LLC v. Ridgway File Date: 12/21/2023 Oral Argument Date: 05/09/2023 SOURCE OF APPEAL
Appeal from Pierce County Superior Court Docket No: 18-2-10533-7 Judgment or order under review Date filed: 03/26/2021 Judge signing: Honorable Elizabeth P. Martin