- PL LL brought action in UD and the action was dismissed. PL appealed.
- TC had ruled that the notice to pay or vacate was improperly served.
- DEF T moved for the appeal to be dismissed based upon the statutory controversy being at an end.
- SC dismissed the appeal.
- PL was actually a lessee under a lease to another, and DEF T was its sublessee.
- PL attempted service of a notice to pay or vacate on its sublessee in possession.
- PL surrendered its possessory interest in the premises after service of the notice but before its expiration.
- The O negotiated a new lease with a TP.
- Following the expiration of the pay or vacate period, PL instituted the UD action.
- The PL’s complaint requested (a) terminatino of the tenancy possession to be restored to it; (b) writ of restitution for delivery of possession; (c) recovery of back rent; and (d) reimbursement for costs and dispersements.
- PL’s action came to trial.
- TC dismissed the action for improper service of the notice to pay or vacate.
- Formal judgment of dismissal was entered.
- The new lessee served the DEF in possession with a notice to pay or vacate upon the TC dismissing the PL’s action, commenced a UD action, received a judgment of restoration of the premises and for back rent. The DEF quit the premises.
- The DEF moved the SC to dismiss the appeal.
The issue raised by the motion to dismiss is:
May an action for unlawful detainer, pursuant to RCW 59.12.030(3), be maintained by a plaintiff-lessor who has conveyed all of his possessory interest in the subject property to a third party after service of the statutory 3-day notice to pay rent or vacate and before expiration of the 3-day period and commencement of the action by service and filing of the statutory summons and complaint.
NO.
Unlawful detainer actions are statutorily created summary proceedings, primarily designed for the purpose of hastening recovery of possession of real property.
- Wilson v. Daniels, 31 Wash.2d 633, 198 P.2d 496;
- Woodward v. Blanchett, 36 Wash.2d 27, 216 P.2d 228;
- Little v. Catania, 48 Wash.2d 890, 297 P.2d 255;
- Muscatel v. Storey, 56 Wash.2d 635, 354 P.2d 931;
- Young v. Riley, 59 Wash.2d 50, 365 P.2d 769.
The principal subject matter of the action is the possession of the subject property.
- Stevens v. Jones, 40 Wash. 484, 82 P. 754.
In such proceedings the superior court sits as a special statutory tribunal, limited to deciding the primary issue of right to possession together with the statutorily designated incidents thereto, i.e., restitution and rent or damages. It does not sit as a court of general civil jurisdiction.
- Stevens v. Jones, supra;
- Young v. Riley, supra; *547
- Sundholm v. Patch, 62 Wash.2d 244, 382 P.2d 262.
Such jurisdiction as the superior court obtains arises out of service of the statutory summons. It does not arise from service of the statutory notices, e.g., notice to quit, notice to pay rent or vacate.
- State ex rel. Robertson v. Superior Court, 95 Wash. 447, 164 P. 63.
In Stevens v. Jones, supra, this court was faced with a similar problem in that plaintiff had conveyed all interest in the property prior to commencement of an analogous action.3 Under such facts, the appeal was dismissed, the rationale being that, since the ‘subject-matter of the controversy was the possession of the land,’ the controversy ‘ceased’ as between the plaintiff and defendant, when plaintiff gave up the right of possession. With regard to the plaintiff’s claim for damages, analogous to the instant claim for rent, we said (p. 40 Wash. 486, 82 P. p. 755):
‘* * * Any claim she may have had for damages could be waged in this summary action only as an incident to her right to possession. The right to damages is a personal one, and when unaccompanied with the right to recover possession must be waged in an ordinary civil action. * * *’
In the instant case, when plaintiff on June 1, 1962, surrendered his lessor’s interest in the premises to his landlord, he lost his possessory right in the property as against defendant. His right to recover past due rent owing to him from the defendant was relegated to the processes of an ordinary civil action. His appeal from the judgment dismissing his action in unlawful detainer avails him nought. Accordingly, we do not reach the points raised on the appeal, i.e., the validity of the service upon the defendant of the notice to pay rent or vacate.
MacRae v. Way Supreme Court of Washington, Department 2. | June 4, 1964 | 64 Wash.2d 544 | 392 P.2d 827
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MacRae v. Way, 64 Wn.2d 544, 392 P.2d 827 (1964)
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64 Wash.2d 544, 392 P.2d 827
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February 3, 2024 at 4:49 PM
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DISMISSAL
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64 Wash.2d 544 Supreme Court of Washington, Department 2. Gordon S. MacRAE, Appellant, v. Jack Eugene WAY, Jr., Respondent. No. 36836.
June 4, 1964. Synopsis Unlawful detainer action by lessee-sublessor against sublessee for failure to pay rent. The Superior Court, King County, George H. Revelle, J., entered judgment dismissing action, and lessee-sublessor appealed. The Supreme Court held that action could not be maintained by lessee-sublessor who had conveyed all his possessory interest in leased property to third party after service of statutory 3-day notice to pay rent or vacate and before expiration of 3-day period and commencement of action by service and filing of statutory summons and complaint, and that lessee-sublessor lost his possessory right in leased property as against sublessee and his right to recover past due rent owed him by sublessee and was relegated to process of an ordinary civil action to collect past due rent, when lessee-sublessor surrendered his lessor’s interest in the premises to lessor.
Motion to dismiss appeal granted.
West Headnotes (6)
[1]
Landlord and TenantProper plaintiffs
233Landlord and Tenant 233VIIIReentry and Recovery of Possession by Landlord 233VIII(D)Actions for Unlawful Detainer 233k1790Actions 233k1795Parties 233k1795(2)Proper plaintiffs (Formerly 233k291(4))
Action for unlawful detainer could not be maintained by former lessor who had conveyed all his possessory interest in leased property to third party after service of statutory 3-day notice to pay rent or vacate and before expiration of 3-day period and commencement of action by service and filing of statutory summons and complaint. RCWA 59.12.030(3). 2 Cases that cite this headnote
[2]
Forcible Entry and DetainerNature and Form of Remedy
179Forcible Entry and Detainer 179ICivil Liability 179k6Nature and Form of Remedy 179k6(1)In general
Unlawful detainer actions are statutorily created summary proceedings, primarily designed for purpose of hastening recovery of possession of realty. RCWA 59.12.030(3). 8 Cases that cite this headnote
[3]
Forcible Entry and DetainerTrial of title and right of possession
179Forcible Entry and Detainer 179ICivil Liability 179k6Nature and Form of Remedy 179k6(2)Trial of title and right of possession
Principal subject matter of unlawful detainer action is possession of subject property. RCWA 59.12.030(3). 2 Cases that cite this headnote
[4]
Landlord and TenantJurisdiction
233Landlord and Tenant 233VIIIReentry and Recovery of Possession by Landlord 233VIII(D)Actions for Unlawful Detainer 233k1790Actions 233k1792Jurisdiction (Formerly 233k291(6.5), 233k291(61/2))
Superior Court sits as a special statutory tribunal in unlawful detainer action and is limited to deciding primary issue of right to possession, together with statutorily designated incidents such as restitution, rent, or damages. RCWA 59.12.030(3). 14 Cases that cite this headnote
[5]
Landlord and TenantSummons or other process
233Landlord and Tenant 233VIIIReentry and Recovery of Possession by Landlord 233VIII(D)Actions for Unlawful Detainer 233k1790Actions 233k1797Summons or other process (Formerly 233k291(1))
Superior Court’s jurisdiction in unlawful detainer action arises out of service of statutory summons, not statutory notices to quit, pay rent, or vacate. RCWA 59.12.030(3). 1 Case that cites this headnote
[6]
Landlord and TenantNature and Form of Remedy
233Landlord and Tenant 233VIIRent 233VII(B)Actions 233k1530Nature and Form of Remedy 233k1531In general (Formerly 233k217(1))
Lessee-sublessor lost his possessory right in leased property as against sublessee and was relegated to process of an ordinary civil action to collect past due rent, when lessee-sublessor surrendered his lessor’s interest in the premises to lessor. RCWA 59.12.030(3). 1 Case that cites this headnote
Attorneys and Law Firms *545 **828 George R. LaBissoniere, Seattle, for appellant. Henry Opendack, James A. Alfieri, Seattle, for respondent. Opinion
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals from a judgment dismissing his action for unlawful detainer instituted under RCW 59.12.030(3), i.e., for failure to pay rent. The basis upon which the trial court dismissed the action was that the notice to pay rent or vacate was improperly served.
On the date of the alleged service of the notice to pay or vacate, May 29, 1962,1 plaintiff’s possessory interest in the property involved was that of a lessee. Defendant was plaintiff’s sub-lessee. It is undisputed that on June 1, 1962, plaintiff surrendered his leasehold interest to his lessor, who, in turn, negotiated a lease with Consolidated Moving, Inc., a newly formed Washington corporation.
1
It is undisputed that defendant did not receive a copy of the notice until May 31, 1962, when it was delivered to him through the mail.
On June 6, 1962, plaintiff commenced this action in unlawful detainer by serving and filing his complaint. He posted bond and concurrently secured the issuance and service of a writ of restitution. Thirteen days later an amended complaint was filed. The amended complaint prayed for (a) the termination of the tenancy and that possession be restored to plaintiff; (b) a writ of restitution directing the sheriff to deliver possession of the premises to plaintiff; (c) recovery of $300 in back rent; and (d) reimbursement for costs and disbursements to plaintiff.
The cause came on for trial on June 29, 1962, at the conclusion of which the trial court orally announced its dismissal of the action upon the grounds heretofore stated. Formal judgment of dismissal was entered on July 27, 1962, from which plaintiff appeals.
*546 On the day of the trial court’s oral decision, Consolidated Moving, Inc., served defendant with a notice to pay rent or vacate, and thereafter commenced an unlawful detainer action which resulted in a judgment **829 of restoration and for back rent from June 1, 1962. No appeal has been taken from Consolidated’s judgment, and defendant quit the premises before plaintiff’s notice of appeal in this action.
[1] Following plaintiff’s notice of appeal, defendant moved to dismiss, and this court, after hearing arguments upon the motion, ordered it ‘passed to the merits.’2 The issue raised by the motion to dismiss is: May an action for unlawful detainer, pursuant to RCW 59.12.030(3), be maintained by a plaintiff-lessor who has conveyed all of his possessory interest in the subject property to a third party after service of the statutory 3-day notice to pay rent or vacate and before expiration of the 3-day period and commencement of the action by service and filing of the statutory summons and complaint.
2
Inadvertently counsel for the parties were notified that the motion had been denied. Upon discovery of the error, counsel were advised thereof and afforded an opportunity to submit additional written arguments.
We answer the question in the negative.
[2] [3] [4] [5] Unlawful detainer actions are statutorily created summary proceedings, primarily designed for the purpose of hastening recovery of possession of real property. Wilson v. Daniels, 31 Wash.2d 633, 198 P.2d 496; Woodward v. Blanchett, 36 Wash.2d 27, 216 P.2d 228; Little v. Catania, 48 Wash.2d 890, 297 P.2d 255; Muscatel v. Storey, 56 Wash.2d 635, 354 P.2d 931; Young v. Riley, 59 Wash.2d 50, 365 P.2d 769. The principal subject matter of the action is the possession of the subject property. Stevens v. Jones, 40 Wash. 484, 82 P. 754. In such proceedings the superior court sits as a special statutory tribunal, limited to deciding the primary issue of right to possession together with the statutorily designated incidents thereto, i.e., restitution and rent or damages. It does not sit as a court of general civil jurisdiction. Stevens v. Jones, supra; Young v. Riley, supra; *547 Sundholm v. Patch, 62 Wash.2d 244, 382 P.2d 262. Such jurisdiction as the superior court obtains arises out of service of the statutory summons. It does not arise from service of the statutory notices, e.g., notice to quit, notice to pay rent or vacate. State ex rel. Robertson v. Superior Court, 95 Wash. 447, 164 P. 63.
In Stevens v. Jones, supra, this court was faced with a similar problem in that plaintiff had conveyed all interest in the property prior to commencement of an analogous action.3 Under such facts, the appeal was dismissed, the rationale being that, since the ‘subject-matter of the controversy was the possession of the land,’ the controversy ‘ceased’ as between the plaintiff and defendant, when plaintiff gave up the right of possession. With regard to the plaintiff’s claim for damages, analogous to the instant claim for rent, we said (p. 40 Wash. 486, 82 P. p. 755): 3
Examination of the transcript and briefs in Stevens v. Jones, 40 Wash. 484, 82 P. 754, reveals the action to have been pursued under the provisions of RCW 59.12.030(1) and (4).
‘* * * Any claim she may have had for damages could be waged in this summary action only as an incident to her right to possession. The right to damages is a personal one, and when unaccompanied with the right to recover possession must be waged in an ordinary civil action. * * *’
[6] In the instant case, when plaintiff on June 1, 1962, surrendered his lessor’s interest in the premises to his landlord, he lost his possessory right in the property as against defendant. His right to recover past due rent owing to him from the defendant was relegated to the processes of an ordinary civil action. His appeal from the judgment dismissing his action in unlawful detainer avails him nought. Accordingly, we do not reach the points raised on the appeal, i.e., the validity of the service upon the defendant of the notice to pay rent or vacate.
The motion to dismiss the appeal is granted. All Citations 64 Wash.2d 544, 392 P.2d 827 End of Document
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