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docs: add a section about Censorship Timeout #1945

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this pull request adds a short explanation about censorship timeout into section about how the arbitrum sequencer works

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Converting this to draft mode so as to not merge this in until the BoLD upgrade has passed.

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LGTM!
Just a minor suggestion added!

@@ -259,3 +260,28 @@ Developers and users should consider the appropriate level of finality based on
### Decentralized Fair Sequencing

Arbitrum’s long-term vision includes transitioning from a centralized Sequencer to a decentralized, fair sequencing model. In this framework, a committee of servers (or validators) collectively determines transaction ordering, ensuring fairness, reducing the influence of any single party, and making it more resistant to manipulation. By requiring a supermajority consensus, this approach distributes sequencing power among multiple honest participants, mitigates the risks of front-running or censorship, and aligns with the broader blockchain principles of enhanced security, transparency, and decentralization.

## Censorship Timeout
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I think it makes sense to move this section on top of ### Decentralized Fair Sequencing section.


### How the Censorship Timeout feature works

To explain how this feature improves the security of chains settling to Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova, consider the scenario where an L3’s parent chain sequencer (the L2 sequencer) is censoring or offline. In such a case, every assertion and/or sub-challenge move would need to wait 24 hours before they could bypass the L2 sequencer (using the SequencerInbox’s forceInclusion method described here). In this scenario, challenge resolution would be delayed by a time `t` where `t = (24 hours) * number of moves for a challenge`. To illustrate with sample numbers, if a challenge takes 50 sequential moves to resolve, then the delay would be 50 days.
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To explain how this feature improves the security of chains settling to Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova, consider the scenario where an L3’s parent chain sequencer (the L2 sequencer) is censoring or offline. In such a case, every assertion and/or sub-challenge move would need to wait 24 hours before they could bypass the L2 sequencer (using the SequencerInbox’s forceInclusion method described here). In this scenario, challenge resolution would be delayed by a time `t` where `t = (24 hours) * number of moves for a challenge`. To illustrate with sample numbers, if a challenge takes 50 sequential moves to resolve, then the delay would be 50 days.
To explain how this feature improves the security of chains settling to Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova, consider the scenario where an L3’s parent chain sequencer (the L2 sequencer) is censoring or offline. In such a case, every assertion and/or sub-challenge move would need to wait 24 hours before bypassing the L2 sequencer (using the SequencerInbox’s forceInclusion method described here). In this scenario, challenge resolution would be delayed by a time `t` where `t = (24 hours) * number of moves for a challenge`. To illustrate with sample numbers, if a challenge takes 50 sequential moves to resolve, then the delay would be 50 days.


To explain how this feature improves the security of chains settling to Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova, consider the scenario where an L3’s parent chain sequencer (the L2 sequencer) is censoring or offline. In such a case, every assertion and/or sub-challenge move would need to wait 24 hours before they could bypass the L2 sequencer (using the SequencerInbox’s forceInclusion method described here). In this scenario, challenge resolution would be delayed by a time `t` where `t = (24 hours) * number of moves for a challenge`. To illustrate with sample numbers, if a challenge takes 50 sequential moves to resolve, then the delay would be 50 days.

The Censorship Timeout feature mitigates this by implementing a time threshold that is decremented when unexpected delays in assertion posting occur due to one (or all) of the above mentioned cases of censorship or sequencer outage. Once that time threshold is met, the force inclusion window is lowered - effectively enabling entities to make moves without the 24 hour delay-per-move.
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The Censorship Timeout feature mitigates this by implementing a time threshold that is decremented when unexpected delays in assertion posting occur due to one (or all) of the above mentioned cases of censorship or sequencer outage. Once that time threshold is met, the force inclusion window is lowered - effectively enabling entities to make moves without the 24 hour delay-per-move.
The Censorship Timeout feature mitigates this by implementing a time threshold that is decremented when unexpected delays in assertion posting occur due to one (or all) of the above-mentioned cases of censorship or sequencer outage. Once that time threshold is met, the force inclusion window is lowered, enabling entities to make moves without the 24-hour delay-per-move.

Comment on lines +283 to +287
- `delay buffer` = 14400 L1 Ethereum blocks (2 days)
- `threshold` = 150 L1 Ethereum blocks (30 minutes) for Arbitrum One and 300 L1 Ethereum blocks (1 hour) for Arbitrum Nova
- `replenish rate` = 5% (meaning 1 day is replenished every 20 days, or roughly a 95% uptime)

We believe that the Censorship Timeout feature provides stronger guarantees of censorship resistance for Arbitrum chains - especially those that settle to Arbitrum One or Arbitrum Nova. As always, chain owners can decide whether to utilize this feature for their chain and can also change the default parameters as they see fit for their use case.
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- `delay buffer` = 14400 L1 Ethereum blocks (2 days)
- `threshold` = 150 L1 Ethereum blocks (30 minutes) for Arbitrum One and 300 L1 Ethereum blocks (1 hour) for Arbitrum Nova
- `replenish rate` = 5% (meaning 1 day is replenished every 20 days, or roughly a 95% uptime)
We believe that the Censorship Timeout feature provides stronger guarantees of censorship resistance for Arbitrum chains - especially those that settle to Arbitrum One or Arbitrum Nova. As always, chain owners can decide whether to utilize this feature for their chain and can also change the default parameters as they see fit for their use case.
- `delay buffer` = 14400 L1 Ethereum blocks (2 days)
- `threshold` = 150 L1 Ethereum blocks (30 minutes) for Arbitrum One and 300 L1 Ethereum blocks (1 hour) for Arbitrum Nova
- `replenish rate` = 5% (meaning 1 day is replenished every 20 days or roughly a 95% uptime)
We believe that the Censorship Timeout feature provides stronger guarantees of censorship resistance for Arbitrum chains - especially those that settle to Arbitrum One or Arbitrum Nova. As always, chain owners can decide whether to utilize this feature for their chain and can also change the default parameters as they see fit for their use case.

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@anegg0 anegg0 left a comment

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Left a few editorial suggestions, otherwise, this LGTM.

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