-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 112
Commit
This commit does not belong to any branch on this repository, and may belong to a fork outside of the repository.
Add UK Capital Gains Tax post (#2196)
* Capital-Gains-Tax-post * fixing style
- Loading branch information
1 parent
e9e4a1e
commit 5165050
Showing
4 changed files
with
44 additions
and
0 deletions.
There are no files selected for viewing
Loading
Sorry, something went wrong. Reload?
Sorry, we cannot display this file.
Sorry, this file is invalid so it cannot be displayed.
Loading
Sorry, something went wrong. Reload?
Sorry, we cannot display this file.
Sorry, this file is invalid so it cannot be displayed.
This file contains bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
---|---|---|
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ | ||
The Autumn Budget 2024 includes substantial reforms to Capital Gains Tax (CGT), with Chancellor Rachel Reeves announcing rate increases across all tax bands. The changes raise the rates from 10% and 20% to 18% and 24%, respectively. | ||
|
||
When accounting for behavioural responses, we project that these changes will raise £6.4 billion from 2025 to 2029\. In 2025 without behavioural responses, they will affect 1.2% of the population and reduce the Gini index of income inequality by 0.4%. | ||
|
||
## Budgetary impacts | ||
|
||
We project the CGT reforms will raise £6.4 billion from 2025 to 2029\. | ||
|
||
| Fiscal Year | 2024-25 | 2025-26 | 2026-27 | 2027-28 | 2028-29 | 2029-30 | Total | | ||
| :------------ | :------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :---- | | ||
| Revenue (£bn) | 0.0 | [1.0](https://policyengine.org/uk/policy?focus=policyOutput.policyBreakdown&reform=69739®ion=uk&timePeriod=2025&baseline=1) | [1.2](https://policyengine.org/uk/policy?focus=policyOutput.policyBreakdown&reform=69739®ion=uk&timePeriod=2026&baseline=1) | [1.4](https://policyengine.org/uk/policy?focus=policyOutput.policyBreakdown&reform=69739®ion=uk&timePeriod=2027&baseline=1) | [1.4](https://policyengine.org/uk/policy?focus=policyOutput.policyBreakdown&reform=69739®ion=uk&timePeriod=2028&baseline=1) | [1.4](https://policyengine.org/uk/policy?focus=policyOutput.policyBreakdown&reform=69739®ion=uk&timePeriod=2029&baseline=1) | 6.4 | | ||
|
||
These estimates are 29% less than HMT and 26% less than the OBR. These variations may stem from different assumptions about behavioural responses. In our model, we assume individuals will adjust their capital gains realisations with an elasticity of \-0.7 with respect to the marginal tax rate; neither HMT nor OBR specify their assumptions on this front. | ||
|
||
| Source | 2024-25 | 2025-26 | 2026-27 | 2027-28 | 2028-29 | 2029-30 | Total | | ||
| ------------ | ------- | ------- | ------- | ------- | ------- | ------- | ----- | | ||
| PolicyEngine | 0.0 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 6.4 | | ||
| HM Treasury | 0.1 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 9.0 | | ||
| OBR | 0.1 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 8.6 | | ||
|
||
Assuming [no behavioural change](https://policyengine.org/uk/policy?focus=policyOutput.policyBreakdown&reform=69732®ion=uk&timePeriod=2025&baseline=1), we project the change to generate £22.2 billion from 2025 to 2029\. While the OBR also provides estimates it describes as static, those account for changes in realisation behaviour, making them incomparable to our static results. | ||
|
||
## Distributional impact | ||
|
||
The CGT reforms affect 1.2% of the population, with impacts limited to the highest income decile. Within the top 10%, 5% see income losses above 5%, another 5% face losses under 5%, while 90% experience no change. The policy has no impact on income levels across the bottom nine deciles. | ||
|
||
Our [distributional analysis](https://policyengine.org/uk/policy?focus=policyOutput.inequalityImpact&reform=69732®ion=uk&timePeriod=2025&baseline=1) shows no change in poverty measures, while the Gini index falls by 0.4%. Across most of the income distribution (the bottom 90% of households), incomes remain unchanged. | ||
|
||
![](/images/posts/cgt-autumn-budget-pic/cgt-win-loser.png) | ||
|
||
Read more of PolicyEngine’s Autumn Budget 2024 coverage: | ||
|
||
- [Employer National Insurance reforms](https://policyengine.org/uk/research/autumn-budget-24-employer-ni) | ||
- [Private school VAT changes](https://policyengine.org/uk/research/vat-school-comparison) | ||
- [Fuel Duty freeze](https://policyengine.org/uk/research/autumn-budget-24-fuel-duty) |
This file contains bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters